(My) BruCON 2016 notes (3)

Here are my quick notes from the BruCON 2016 conference. All the slides can be found here.

NO EASY BREACH:Challenges and Lessons Learned from an Epic Investigation bruCon

The attack started with a phishing email; the attack compromised more that 2 000 systems, 50 000 emails.

How the attack took place:

1. fast-paced attacher

  • 10-25 systems infected every day.
  • the attacker steal information every day.

response

  • develop indicators to aid triage.
  • focus on : lateral movements, pivoting, recon, new tools or back-doors.
  • streamlined documentation.

lessons learned

  • be fast and flexible.

2. stealthy attacks

  • used anti-forensics techniques to hide endpoint and network activity.
  • altered communication scheme + strong crypto.
  • mass activity to obscure the real target.
  • data theft using only legitimate us-based services – gmail, google drives, one drive.

response

  • maximize the utility of trace forensics artifacts.
  • some attacker behavior recovered from sdelete.
  • took time and patience to filter out the network noise.
  • deployed additional open-source tech

lessons learned

  • improve visibility and don’t stop looking.
  • map attacker activity ti potential data sources.
  • network times provides reliable chronology.

3. rapidly evolving tactics

  • seven unique persistence mechanism.
  • seven distinct back-door families.
  • minimal re-use of meta-data commonly tracked and shared as indicator.

response

  •  fought to keep network visibility on all malware families.
  • spent time analyzing system with unknown activity.
  • create indicators for every stage of attack life-cycle.
  • develop flexible & resilient indicators

lessons learned

  • enhance and test your best indicators even when they’re working.

4. advanced attack techniques

  • attacker leveraged PowerShell.
  • used Windows Management Instrumentation.
  • attacker used Kerberos tickets attacks which made tracking lateral movement difficult.

response

  • searched for WMI persistence.
  • identified evidence of attacker code in WMI repository.
  • parsed out embedded scripts and malware.
  • updated the environment to power shell 3.0 and enabled logging.
  • turned attacker power shell usage from a threat to a benefit by logging and iocs to made findings attacker activity much easier.
  • worked around Kerberos attacks: looked for remote Kerberos logons around the time of attacker activity.

Hacking KPN: Lessons from the trenches

The presentation was about 3 different vulnerabilities discovered by the kpn read team.

  1. vulnerability linked to the Java de-serialisation vulnerability.
    1. the kpn team did a java deserialization burp plug-in fork
  2. Citrix Netscaler
    1. Netscaler login vulnerabiilty
  3. reverse-engineering cryptography from binary

New Adventures in Active Defense, Offensive Countermeasures and Hacking Back

The idea was that the security industry are doing the same things over and over again, very often as a defender we build very static walls. So the presenter propose to an “active defense”:

Active defense is not about :

  • hacking back
  • about one technical solution
  • revenge

Active defense is about:

  • have a range of solutions.

All the proposed solutions and demos are part of the advanced defense harbinger distribution which is a Linux distribution based on Ubuntu LTS that it comes with many tools aimed at active defense pre-installed and configured. Some demos of the following components:

  • weblabyrinth
  • honey ports
  • honey badger
  • jarcombiner

(My) BruCON 2016 notes (2)

Here are my quick notes from the BruCON 2016 conference. All the slides can be found here.

What Does the Perfect Door or Padlock Look Like?bruCon

The talk was about how (some) doors and padlocks can be easily opened. The presentation was full of videos and explanatory schemes. For the doors the following parts can be attacked:

  • hinge removal – to fix, use jam pins
  • the latch
  • the inside handle
  • key boxes
  • edge baps – request to exit sensors
  • the bottom gap
  • the door frame

Anti-Forensics AF

The presentation contained the following topics:

  • memory anti-forencics
    • the goal is to inhibit the acquisition and analysis
    • for windows, removing PE header from disk (once the executable is loaded in memory).
    • for windows, zero the header from disk (once the executable is loaded in memory).
    • for linux, remove the EMF header
    • for linux, zero the header (memeset)
  • android anti-forestics
    • use encryption to protect.
    • power down the device.
    • leverage device sensors; foe ex: if the phone is moving, then shut down the device
  • fun with sd cards
    • demo of the SDTool tool that modifies the SD card firmware to write/or not the card or in memory.

Esoteric Web application vulnerabilities

The sql injection vulnerability is dead due to the massive use of the ORM frameworks, the same for the XSS injections due to the mvc, templates and default HTML So, as a hacker you must find new vulnerabilities; here are 5 (esoteric) vulnerabilities:

  1. aggressive input decoding; nosql injection using ruby on rails and MongoDB
  2. call me to verify my identity; try to hack the phone activation procedure for a 2 FA functionality.
  3. password reset implementation feature; try to hack the password reset feature for a 2 FA
  4. hack around the usage of the Paypal IPN protoco
  5. just missed that one; it happen even to the best of us.

Scraping Leaky browsers for Fun and Password

The idea is to retrieve passwords stored by the browsers (in RAM) by scrapping the RAM content. Do to this a plug-in to Volatility framework was created (the plug-in will be available soon on GitHub).

The best browser is Chrome with 67% chances to expose the passwords; the worst browser is Firefox with 81% changes to expose the passwords.

Vendors response to this findings; Microsoft created a CVE and the path will be pushed in October/November, Google and Mozilla are denying that’s a real issue.

 

(My) BruCON 2016 notes (1)

Here are my quick notes from the BruCON 2016 conference. All the slides can be found here.

Keynote –  inventing defensivebruCon

The keynote was quite entertaining mainly because it used references to the Greek and Babylonian mythology but on the other side  it was very difficult to really understand the message and the ideas that the presenter tried to promote.
But here some ideas that I was able to catch:

  • assume compromise
  • business people do not understand the security goals
  • perimeter defense; you have to win every time; one single mistake and the perimeter can be breach.
  • attackers are using the speed; the defenders have never the initiative.

Security through design

The presenter believes that the security is seen by the casual user/client as a burden. The security peoples should try to understand why the users try to circumvent the security, try to understand how the peoples are working and must try to adapt the security to fit the user needs.

The possible solutions are not from the IT world; try to apply the design thinking. A good design solution should have the following properties:

  •  is innovative
  • makes a product useful
  • makes a product understandable
  • is long-lasting
  • is unobtrusive

Some examples of products/companies that are trying to understand better the client: 2g Tuesday at Facebook

Building a Successful Internal Adversarial Simulation Team

The problems with the security testing today :

  • limited metrics
  • increase technical debt.
  • gives limited experience.

Another major problem is that the read team and blue team are acting independently, do not really share knowledge.

The speakers proposed some solutions to this problem; some of the interesting points that I was able to catch:

  • predict the likelihood of successful attacks before they happen.
  • creation of an information sharing platform and knowledge base.
  • assemble your team and tools
  • create defensive measurements/metrics.
Shlomi Zeltsinger

Blockchain made simple