(My) BruCON 2016 notes (3)

Here are my quick notes from the BruCON 2016 conference. All the slides can be found here.

NO EASY BREACH:Challenges and Lessons Learned from an Epic Investigation bruCon

The attack started with a phishing email; the attack compromised more that 2 000 systems, 50 000 emails.

How the attack took place:

1. fast-paced attacher

  • 10-25 systems infected every day.
  • the attacker steal information every day.

response

  • develop indicators to aid triage.
  • focus on : lateral movements, pivoting, recon, new tools or back-doors.
  • streamlined documentation.

lessons learned

  • be fast and flexible.

2. stealthy attacks

  • used anti-forensics techniques to hide endpoint and network activity.
  • altered communication scheme + strong crypto.
  • mass activity to obscure the real target.
  • data theft using only legitimate us-based services – gmail, google drives, one drive.

response

  • maximize the utility of trace forensics artifacts.
  • some attacker behavior recovered from sdelete.
  • took time and patience to filter out the network noise.
  • deployed additional open-source tech

lessons learned

  • improve visibility and don’t stop looking.
  • map attacker activity ti potential data sources.
  • network times provides reliable chronology.

3. rapidly evolving tactics

  • seven unique persistence mechanism.
  • seven distinct back-door families.
  • minimal re-use of meta-data commonly tracked and shared as indicator.

response

  •  fought to keep network visibility on all malware families.
  • spent time analyzing system with unknown activity.
  • create indicators for every stage of attack life-cycle.
  • develop flexible & resilient indicators

lessons learned

  • enhance and test your best indicators even when they’re working.

4. advanced attack techniques

  • attacker leveraged PowerShell.
  • used Windows Management Instrumentation.
  • attacker used Kerberos tickets attacks which made tracking lateral movement difficult.

response

  • searched for WMI persistence.
  • identified evidence of attacker code in WMI repository.
  • parsed out embedded scripts and malware.
  • updated the environment to power shell 3.0 and enabled logging.
  • turned attacker power shell usage from a threat to a benefit by logging and iocs to made findings attacker activity much easier.
  • worked around Kerberos attacks: looked for remote Kerberos logons around the time of attacker activity.

Hacking KPN: Lessons from the trenches

The presentation was about 3 different vulnerabilities discovered by the kpn read team.

  1. vulnerability linked to the Java de-serialisation vulnerability.
    1. the kpn team did a java deserialization burp plug-in fork
  2. Citrix Netscaler
    1. Netscaler login vulnerabiilty
  3. reverse-engineering cryptography from binary

New Adventures in Active Defense, Offensive Countermeasures and Hacking Back

The idea was that the security industry are doing the same things over and over again, very often as a defender we build very static walls. So the presenter propose to an “active defense”:

Active defense is not about :

  • hacking back
  • about one technical solution
  • revenge

Active defense is about:

  • have a range of solutions.

All the proposed solutions and demos are part of the advanced defense harbinger distribution which is a Linux distribution based on Ubuntu LTS that it comes with many tools aimed at active defense pre-installed and configured. Some demos of the following components:

  • weblabyrinth
  • honey ports
  • honey badger
  • jarcombiner

(My) BruCON 2015 notes (4)

Here are my quick notes from the BruCON 2015 conference. All the slides can be found here.

The malware is just code so, as any other code it is possible (in theory) to analyze/reverse engineer it manually.

The triage is one of the functions of the incident response program and must answer the following three questions regarded to a specific input:

  • is the input malicious ?
  • if yes, what is exploiting ?
  • are we exposed ?

Triage is not malware analysis and should be quick and efficient. The triage workflow:

  • passive analysis.
  • first interaction and download.
    • some malware are crafted to be able to interact with the initial URL only limited number of times
    • some malware could profile your browser, check the browser version, platform, or use the user agent script to decide if the exploit can be executed or not.
    • some tools:useragentstring.com (to check your user agent), onlinecurl.com (on-line version of curl, copy paste a url and you get back the response), hurl.it (idem as previous one).
  • web component analysis.
    • once you have the web component (which is typically an html page + JavaScript) you could try to analyze it.
    • use jsBeautify.org to try to have something human readable in case the code is obfuscated.
    • try to use the browser debugger, eventually change JavaScript eval expressions.
  • exploit analysis.
    • can use showmycode.com to understand the exploit; it is capable to decompile Java, Flash, .Net, PHP
    • sometimes you can blindly search the metasploit exploit template library
  • payload extraction.
  • payload analysis.
    • can submit the file/s to VirusTotal or malwr (virtualized Cuckoo instances).
    • malwr can give you infos about the registry keys created, network traffic.
  • build IOCs (Indication Of Compromise).
    • collection of indicators which can be used to describe a compromised system.

This was an workshop, so the participants had to play with some of the tools. Here is the quick workflow that i followed:

start from a url -> use the onlinecurl.com to get the response (initial interaction) -> saved the response on a file and used to browser debugger to understand what the component is doing (web component analysis)-> get from the JavaScript another url that contains a link to a Java .class file -> use it showmycode.com to decompile the class file (exploit analysis)-> write some Java code to decode parts of the exploit and execute it on ideone.com (payload extraction)-> …time over :(.